Thursday, September 24, 2009

Nixon orders U.S. Drive Into Cambodia


Nixon Orders U.S. Drive Into Cambodia

Headquarters for Entire Red Effort in S. Vietnam Is Target

Los Angeles Times

May 1, 1970

The Los Angeles Times published this article when United States troops invaded Cambodia during the Vietnam War. The invasion sparked many antiwar protests across the United States because bombings of Cambodia were carried out in secret and took place during a time when U.S. officials had pledged to withdraw troops from the region. Because the article was published shortly after the event took place, it contains information that may have been subsequently revised or updated.

By Stuart H. Loory

Washington—President Nixon ordered several thousand American troops into Cambodia Thursday to wipe out the “headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.”

“This is not an invasion of Cambodia,” the commander-in-chief, speaking from his desk in the Oval Office of the White House, told the American people.

White House officials, briefing newsmen before the President went on television and radio, estimated that U.S. troops would remain in Cambodia from six weeks to two months. But they did not want to be held to that time frame.

Mr. Nixon appeared tired, grim and tense as he made his most portentous address to the American people.

The President also announced he was sending small arms and other equipment to the Cambodian government headed by Premier Lon Nol for “the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality.”

White House officials said the equipment would include rifles and mortars and would be sent without American advisers or technicians.

Expanding on the no-invasion theme, Mr. Nixon said: “The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once the enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.”

The American-dominated offensive, to be carried out in company with South Vietnamese troops, will be in an area of Cambodia known as the Fishhook, about 70 miles northwest of Saigon and bordering on the South Vietnamese province of Tay Ninh. It will be coordinated with the previously announced American-advised South Vietnamese offensive in the so-called Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia, 36 miles west of Saigon.

The intent is to clean out the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia from which, the President said, threats against South Vietnam have been mounted for five years.

Action Termed “Indispensable”

He said the action was “indispensable” to continuing success of the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, would help end the war more quickly than otherwise, would keep American casualties at an “absolute minimum” and help secure a “just peace.”

“We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam,” Mr. Nixon said.

Although the President said he was acting to protect the investment of American lives, money and prestige in South Vietnam, he also said he was protecting the nation's role as a first-class world power.

“If when the chips are down, the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world,” he said.

“If we failed to meet this challenge all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.”

Striking Contrast

The President's speech was in striking contrast to the one he delivered only 10 days ago from San Clemente when he ordered the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from South Vietnam over the next year.

At that time, while noting risks involved because of enemy activities in Cambodia, he said enemy activity in South Vietnam had declined and so had American casualties.

In contast, in his Thursday night speech he spoke of the “massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualties.”

White House sources left no doubt Mr. Nixon realized he was taking a major gamble, not unlike the one former President Lyndon B. Johnson took when he decided on the regular bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965.

40,000 Troops

If the Cambodian cleanup works, 40,000 enemy troops in sanctuary in Cambodia will be quickly and effectively neutralized and the North Vietnamese will be convinced that their best chance for peace rests at the negotiating table.

If it does not work, the danger of a wider war in Indochina looms large, just as the war escalated when the bombing of North Vietnam failed to bring the enemy to the conference table.

Not only was the Chief Executive committing the prestige of the nation on the international scene with his speech but he committed his own political prestige at home and that of the Republican Party.

“I would rather be a one-term President and do what I think is right,” he said, “than be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.”

Refers to Turmoil

He referred to the turmoil among the nation's youth as a result of the war in these words:

“My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. And even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed.”

The speech left the prospect that the peace movement among the young, which had all but died since last November's massive protests, would again be revived vigorously.

Questions Unanswered

The President's address and the briefings by White House officials left many unanswered questions.

For example, there was no indication of how the new developments affected the continued withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. White House officials would not say whether the withdrawals were still in progress but would only comment that the program for the coming year would not be affected.

Neither the President nor his aides offered any documentation for the alleged enemy buildup in Cambodia during the last two weeks.

Officials also would give no indication of the number of troops involved. Neither did they mention that B-52 bombers would be used in Cambodia as Saigon announced minutes after the President finished speaking.

There was no indication of how far American forces would advance into Cambodia. Neither was there definitive word on whether the Cambodian government agreed to the attack.

There was no word on just when Mr. Nixon made the decision to invade beyond the fact that it came after his San Clemente speech. And finally, there was no indication of whether approval for the action had been sought from the other allies in South Vietnam.

Although there was nothing in the speech that augured well for the prospect of negotiations, the President said he hoped they would occur and that his position, while not softening, had not hardened either. He said he had made major efforts in the past “many of which must remain secret” to achieve negotiations.

The White House was mute on what diplomatic steps had been made to accompany the speech. For example, it would not say whether the Soviet Union had been informed in advance of what the President would say.

Mr. Nixon's speech came at the end of several days of intense work. He went to bed after midnight Wednesday, arose early Thursday and was at his desk before 9 a.m. He ate lunch at his desk and conferred throughout the day with Henry A. Kissinger, his national security adviser; H. R. Haldeman, his chief of staff, and John D. Ehrlichman, his domestic affairs chief, as well as others who were not named.

Just before the speech, Mr. Nixon met with a group of bipartisan congressional leaders in the White House theater to brief them on the contents.

The nature of the speech was so tightly held that even key officials in the State Department, late in the day, did not know what the President would say.

Mr. Nixon ended his speech by asking the support of the American people not for himself but for the troops in the field.

Source: Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1970.

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